Evaluation of attorneys is a difficult task. Law professors, hiring partners, supervising attorneys, judges, and clients all struggle with standards, criteria, and gut instinct. We have to balance the quantity of a lawyer's work against its quality and thoroughness, her effectiveness "on her feet" against her analytic skills as evidenced in extended writing projects, or her mastery of difficult areas of practice against her ability to relate to clients. Our judgment might be clouded by personality clashes, limited evaluative opportunities, competitive feelings, or bias of one sort or another. These uncertainties all arise in the attorney discipline system. In that system, the profession regulates itself, meaning that practicing attorneys evaluate each other. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are designed to protect 1 clients and the justice system through the regulation of attorneys primarily by attorneys and not by some outside regulatory force. 
sufficiently protected from becoming ensnared in the attorney disciplinary system as a result of the fear or ignorance of their fellow lawyers.
The first part of this Article describes the play in the joints of the attorney discipline system. The standards that require attorneys to perform promptly, competently, and diligently are subject to extensive commentary, but they 5 remain by necessity quite vague at their borders. An attorney whose mental illness causes him to be regarded as "eccentric" or peculiar is in danger of being perceived as running afoul of those standards while similarly situated attorneys without mental illness might escape attention. The Article then turns to the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to 6 attorney self-regulation and argues that the very ambiguity of the standards for attorney discipline limits the protections the ADA offers in such cases. It further argues that while the rules for assessing the diligence or competence of a disabled attorney cannot be sharpened, the risks presented by that vagueness can be minimized by creating more specificity in the practice being assessed. That is, while we cannot be more specific about what we mean by "diligent" or "competent" in the abstract, we can work to set practice norms that will more clearly allow differentiation in any particular situation between competent and incompetent practice. The Article next examines the sister profession of medicine and describes a decades-long process of attempting to do just that: apply practice norms to particular aspects of professional practice to allow an assessment of the competence of physicians' particular interventions. The Article encourages the application of the lessons from the medical profession to the law and argues that the sharpening of professional expectations in particular settings can help to shield "eccentric" attorneys from disparate disciplinary attention while potentially providing the side benefit of improving service to clients. lawyers in the practice of their craft. Like members of other professions, lawyers are charged with responsibilities not only to their clients, but by dint of their special expertise and status, to the broader society as well. The 7 special status of the legal profession carries with it the privilege and responsibility of a large degree of self-governance. Attorney ethics rules, 8 exemplified today by the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), address all three aspects of this professional status: enforceable standards of professional practice, at least hortatory statements of social obligation, and clearly framed statements of the need for the profession to police itself in order to avoid civil regulatory intrusions.
A primary function of the Model Rules is to set out standards applicable to client representation. They attempt to set out rules that enforce professional norms of competence, client engagement, and hard work. A competent 9 lawyer must have or obtain the requisite knowledge and skill to perform the required tasks; he need not come into a representation with the necessary 10 training or experience and can bring himself up to speed during the representation or associate himself with another attorney with the necessary training or experience. Once undertaking representation, a lawyer must 11 pursue his client's interests with "reasonable diligence and promptness," 12 inform the client of important developments in the representation, consult with the client before taking important actions, and facilitate the client's ability to make important decisions in the course of the representation. These rules go 13 to the heart of an attorney's responsibilities to her client; they are quite broad and, like common law rules, require interpretation in any particular case.
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B. Interpretation and Application to a Lawyer with Mental Illness
How do these basic rules apply to an attorney with mental illness? The rules, of course, apply to attorneys with mental illness as they do to any other attorney. A lawyer with mental illness must act competently and diligently, 14 and he must communicate appropriately with his client and facilitate the client's ability to make decisions central to the prosecution of the matter for which the attorney was retained. As is more fully described below, the generality-even vagueness-of these rules may raise particular concerns for lawyers with mental illness. Other rules have, or might have, particular bite for lawyers with mental illness. Model Rule 1.16, in particular, bars an attorney from undertaking representation where "the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client."
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The Model Rules require individual lawyers to conform their conduct to the professional standards set out therein. The Model Rules, however, also 16 assign to others in the profession responsibility for the supervision of lawyers to prevent misconduct and the reporting of lawyers accused of misconduct. Two rules in particular touch on this professional policing role. First, Rule 5.1 describes the obligation of supervisory attorneys for the conduct of those they supervise. Supervisory lawyers have an affirmative obligation to operate 17 their firms so as to reasonably assure that "all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct."
All fails to prevent or mitigate the effects of the other lawyer's misconduct. 20 Rule 5.1, then, sets up incentives for supervising attorneys to be vigilant in looking for signs they interpret as indications that a supervised attorney may be running afoul of the rules, and upon perceiving those signs, to act to limit the supervised attorney's practice.
Rule 8.3 obliges attorneys to report another attorney to "the appropriate professional authority" when they determine that the other attorney's professional conduct "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's . . . fitness as a lawyer." The reporting of another attorney is mandatory and 21 applies when the first attorney's knowledge of circumstances raises in his mind "a substantial question" of the other's fitness. This rule sets up incentives for attorneys, including attorneys in adversary positions, to report perceived misconduct to disciplinary authorities.
The operative standards for the engagement of these supervisory or reporting actions are phrased in terms that both are admirable and vague. They are admirable in that they are obviously aimed at protecting clients and the administration of justice. It is appropriate that lawyers themselves be charged with practicing with reasonable competence, diligence, and openness to clients. It is appropriate that supervisory attorneys oversee their subordinates' work so as to reasonably assure competent, diligent, and open practice. And it is appropriate that practitioners who observe misconduct on the part of other attorneys report the misconduct to professional authorities. These steps seem at least minimally responsive to the aspirations of the law to protect clients and to advance social interests in the fair administration of justice.
The standards are also vague. misunderstand, fear, and disparately treat people with mental illness; and (2) the structure of the Model Rules places in the hands of individual lawyers the power and ability to either limit the practice of an attorney with mental illness or to initiate the process of professional discipline that may taint his professional reputation.
Bias Against Those with Mental Illness
Bias against people with mental illness is widespread and appears to be one of the remaining socially acceptable areas of social discrimination.
24
Notwithstanding increasingly sophisticated clinical research on mental illness that demonstrates that most people with mental illness are entirely capable of participating equally in society, people with mental illness continue to suffer inappropriate and unjustified discrimination in employment, housing, and other basic social goods and services. In contrast with physical disabilities, 25 it may be that the problem of bias against those with mental disabilities is growing rather than abating with time.
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The bias is fed by persistent myths and exaggerations about people with mental illness, including perceptions that they are disproportionately violent, cruel, lazy, and unreliable. As is true with other biases (or "isms"), the 27 28 harm to the subjects of discrimination comes not just from ignorance about mental illness, but from the tendency to evaluate a person according to categories rather than on an individualized basis. "mentally ill" according to the evaluator's own view of the capabilities of all persons with mental illness rather than the capabilities of the particular individual with mental illness. The pervasive bias against people with 29 mental illness, then, tends to result in evaluations rooted in mistaken assessments of mental illness and on mistaken categorical assessments of people with mental illness.
The Power of Individuals over Lawyers with Mental Illness
The vulnerability of lawyers with mental illness can be highlighted by application of Model Rules 5.1 and 8.3(a). As is described above, Rule 5.1 governs the obligation of supervisory attorneys to assure the ethical practice of supervised attorneys. The ABA published a formal opinion in 2003 advising of the proper application of Rule 5.1 in situations in which the supervised attorney has a mental impairment. Formal Opinion 03-429 states, 30 in part, "If a lawyer's mental impairment is known to partners in a law firm or a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the impaired lawyer, steps must be taken that are designed to give reasonable assurance that such impairment will not result in breaches of the Model Rules."
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Leave aside the question of why there is a formal opinion on the supervision of lawyers with mental impairments and not, say, lawyers with visual or mobility impairments. It might be stated with some plausible neutrality that the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility received more inquiries on the former than the latter. The explanatory text accompanying Formal Opinion 03-429 advises the bar that some apparent mental disorders may not "materially impair" the attorney's ability to practice. It also cautions the bar that it must be vigilant in its 32 oversight of supervised attorneys with mental impairments:
Unfortunately, the lawyer who suffers from an impairment may be unaware of, or in denial of, the fact that the impairment has affected his ability to represent clients. When the impaired lawyer is unable or unwilling to deal with the consequences of his impairment, the firm's partners and the impaired lawyer's supervisors have an If we could assume that the supervisory attorneys are well-versed in the capabilities of people with mental illness, and further that they are free from bias toward people with mental illness, the above advice might not pose significant concerns. But as is described above, bias, mistrust, and misunderstanding of people with mental illness is widespread, and there is no reason to believe that supervisory attorneys are as a class immune to the generally prevailing condition in this regard. The advice contained in Formal Opinion 03-429 could, if applied by attorneys whose judgment is infected by ignorance or bias with regard to mental illness, lead to the inappropriate narrowing of an attorney's practice, his discharge, or to his being reported to disciplinary authorities in circumstances not calling for such intervention.
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility published another opinion about attorneys with mental impairment. This 37 opinion concerns the obligations of attorneys to report misconduct by other attorneys who are not under the attorney's supervision. The formal opinion states,
A lawyer who believes that another lawyer's known violations of disciplinary rules raise substantial questions about her fitness to practice must report those violations to the appropriate authority. A lawyer who believes that another lawyer's mental condition materially impairs her ability to represent clients, and who knows that the lawyer continues to do so, must report that lawyer's consequent violation of rule 1.16(a)(2), which requires that she withdraw from representation of clients.
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As an initial matter, the second sentence of this opinion contains a drafting oddity. It begins by positing that a lawyer "believes" that another lawyer's mental condition impairs her ability to represent clients. concerns similar to those raised by Formal Opinion 03-429. The opinion notes that lawyers are not experts in identifying or evaluating mental illness and may consult a mental health professional for assistance, although they are not required to do so. The opinion explains that an 40 attorney who concludes that another attorney's mental condition impairs her ability to represent clients, whether on the basis of his own unschooled observations or even on the basis of observations of third parties ("such as 41 a client of the lawyer who complains of the impaired lawyer's conduct"), is 42 obliged to report the other attorney to appropriate professional authorities.
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The concerns raised above regarding Formal Opinion 03-429 apply even more strongly in connection with Formal Opinion 03-431. Against the backdrop of pervasive societal bias, fear, and ignorance regarding people with mental illness, at least the attorneys addressed by Formal Opinion 03-429 have a supervisory relationship with the impaired attorney and the ability to form some common-sense judgments about her capacity to represent clients. Flawed though this assessment might be, it is far preferable to that required by Formal Opinion 03-431, by which an attorney is obliged to report another attorney on the basis of limited contact, possibly through adversarial proceedings, or even on the basis of a complaint from a client of allegedly impaired conduct not witnessed by the reporting attorney. This opinion raises the specter of attorneys obliged against the background of societal ignorance of mental illness to assess another attorney's mental state and capacity to practice on the basis of little or no personal exposure to the other attorney. The attorney discipline process, then, poses particular problems for attorneys with mental illness. Part II, below, addresses two frameworks within which to evaluate possible means to protect these attorneys from unfair bias in the evaluative process: void-for-vagueness doctrine and disability law. 
II. VAGUENESS AND DISABILITY LAW

A. The Problem of the Wide End of the Funnel
The preceding section argues that the application of the Model Rules to the evaluation of attorneys who have, or who are believed to have, mental illness threatens those attorneys with biased application of the Model Rules. It argues that imposing the obligation to assess and evaluate the abilities of attorneys believed to have mental impairments on the rank and file of attorneys gives free rein to the pervasive bias against people with mental illness and will likely lead to discrimination against mentally impaired lawyers. The rules do not speak to a cadre of trained investigators, after all, but to fellow practitioners with no special knowledge of either mental illness or the range of legal practice representing the acceptable norm in the jurisdiction.
A response to this argument might be that the rules, and the formal opinions interpreting them, only oblige attorneys to initiate action and leave to the full disciplinary process the evaluation of the bona fides of the claims of impairment. I accept for the sake of the current argument that many reported cases of bar discipline involving people with mental impairments evidence a robust adversary process, whether or not one agrees with the 44 reasoning or the outcome of those cases. Attorneys with mental illness can 45 take small comfort from the extensive protections provided at the end of the discipline process, however, for two reasons. First, the application of Rule 8.1 and Formal Opinion 03-429 lead not to discipline, but to an obligation to "prevent the attorney from rendering legal services to clients of the firm."
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This action would not in itself lead to any further process unless the affected attorney were to pursue a claim of employment discrimination. Second, and more significant for purposes of this Article, the initiation of discipline is in itself a harm to an attorney with a mental impairment, and if the disciplinary process were to lead to a systematic bias even in the initiation of proceedings, the process would be infected with discriminatory bias. this bias in the initiation of discipline is highlighted by first describing the nature of the early part of the disciplinary process, and then by describing the problem of employing vague standards in such a process.
The Burden of Defending a Disciplinary Matter
Attorneys, like all professionals, have an interest in their professional reputation and, like all persons, a preference for avoiding inaccurate claims of impairment and incapacity. The attorney's ultimate vindication is of limited solace if his reputation has been harmed by accusations of unethical conduct and, in particular, by claims of incapacity due to mental impairment.
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In New Jersey, attorney ethics complaints received from all sources are received by a District Ethics Committee, comprised of attorneys practicing in the committee's geographic district.
If the attorney-secretary of that 48 committee does not dismiss the matter initially, it is investigated, sometimes by another attorney-member of the committee. If the attorney-chair of the 49 committee determines after investigation that there is a "reasonable prospect of a finding of unethical conduct by clear and convincing evidence," then the 50 attorney-director authorizes the filing of a complaint against the subject attorney.
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From the time the complaint is filed, the documents and proceedings are open to the public, including the initial hearing, the administrative hearing 52 on appeal, and any subsequent court review. The process for the affected attorney can involve public disclosure of a complaint alleging unethical conduct, a public hearing before a panel comprising two attorneys and one lay member, review of the decision by a statewide disciplinary review board 56. The void-for-vagueness doctrine has also been used to strike laws that limit free speech. The Court has held that speech rights require "breathing room," and that vague laws may inhibit full expression. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963 
Vagueness
Our tolerance for the possibility that a person will be harmed by being subjected to a burdensome process such as that described in the previous section depends in large part on our confidence that the imposition of the burden is governed by reasonable criteria. There are two significant concerns regarding the guidance provided by the Model Rules and the formal opinions as they apply to lawyers with mental illness. The first is the possibility that the treatment of attorneys with mental illness is discriminatory in violation of the ADA. That issue is taken up in Part II(B) below. The second, taken up in this section, is that the standards are inappropriately vague.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has been employed to invalidate criminal laws that are insufficiently clear in describing the nature of the conduct prohibited. It has been used to invalidate an ordinance permitting the arrest 56 of persons who do not disperse when ordered to do so by the police and anti-57 loitering laws that criminalize being in a public place without an adequate purpose. The justification for the void-for-vagueness doctrine is twofold. 58 First, due process requires that the state inform people of the nature of the conduct that can subject them to punishment. Second, however, vague laws give agents of the state inappropriate discretion to choose to whom to apply the law, empowering law enforcement to use criminal laws for narrow, perhaps personal purposes rather than the broad public purposes for which the laws were created.
59
The void-for-vagueness doctrine likely does not apply in the attorney discipline context. Outside of the First Amendment context it ordinarily applies only to criminal laws, and attorney discipline matters are administrative, quasi-judicial proceedings. the standards creates substantial difficulties in deciding, in close cases, on which side of the line a particular attorney's conduct falls. Second, the pervasive societal bias against people with mental illness, coupled with the informality of the process by which disciplinary action can be initiated, raises concerns about diversion of the process from broad client-protection goals to targeting of disfavored groups of attorneys with mental impairments.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not itself provide a legal lever for challenging the validity of the attorney ethics process as applied to attorneys with mental illness. It highlights, however, the seriousness of the problems created when fellow attorneys, inexpert in the identification and evaluation of mental illness, are charged with overseeing the practice of other attorneys who have, or are suspected of having, some form of mental impairment. The next section examines the application of disability law to this problem.
B. The ADA: Good Intentions, No Remedy
The passage of the ADA raised hopes that the sorts of fear, bias, and stigma faced by lawyers with mental illness would cease improperly interfering with their ability to practice. It was to be an "Emancipation Proclamation" for people with disabilities -the signal for a "bright new era 67. The ADA prohibits disparate treatment in participation in public services, programs, or activities (such as the attorney ethics system) on the basis of disability. See id. § 12132.
68. Id. § 12102(2)(A). The ADA also protects people who are "perceived" to have a disability, or who have a "record" of a disability. Id. § § 12102(2)(B)-(C).
69. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999 only be sketched out here. In brief, the courts' interpretation of the ADA has blocked the way for attorneys seeking its protection in the course of attorney discipline proceedings. The blocking issues briefly discussed below suggest that (1) the attorney may not be "disabled" enough to claim the ADA's protection, and (2) the attorney may be too disabled to be "qualified" for the task of practicing law.
Disability
Attorneys with psychiatric impairments may face discrimination in the application of Model Rule 5.1, when a law firm restricts the lawyer's practice or discharges him from the firm, and under Model Rule 8.1(a), when another Lawyers with mental impairments are likely to be caught in one of these screens and be determined not "disabled," and therefore unable to pursue a claim under the ADA. They will, after all, have succeeded in finishing law school and gaining admission to the bar-how disabled can they be? If their disability is framed as social awkwardness, or limitations in the ability to "get along" with coworkers or other attorneys, they will face several hurdles. It may be that their psychiatric symptoms are "correctable" with medication, in offers a shrinking definition of disability.
Qualification
If the attorney is able to establish that she is disabled for purposes of the ADA, she must then establish that she is "qualified" to act as an attorney notwithstanding her disability. The employment title of the ADA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she is able to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation. The employer's assessment of 75 which aspects of the job are "essential" is entitled to deference. The public 76 services title of the ADA (applicable to the state machinery of attorney discipline) requires that the attorney meet the "essential eligibility Okla. 1996) . 88. Id. at 1120. 89. Formal Opinion 03-429, supra note 14, at 1 ("If a lawyer's mental impairment is known to partners in a law firm . . . , steps must be taken that are designed to give reasonable assurance that such impairment will not result in breaches of the Model Rules.").
90. Formal Opinion 03-431, supra note 37, at 1.
that the attorney's bipolar disorder did not have a causal relationship with the attorney's commission of misconduct. Significantly, the court found in the 84 alternative that, even if a causal connection were shown, it would be required to determine whether the attorney's mental condition would lead to misconduct in the future.
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The strong implication of Clement is that the bar's assessment of an attorney's qualification to practice law ethically will guide courts in discipline cases. This implication follows in part from the deference the court showed to the bar's fact-finding process. In addition, however, it follows from the 86 shared interest of the bar and the courts to shore up the social reputation of lawyers and the justice system. In Oklahoma Bar Association v. Busch, the 87 Oklahoma Supreme Court described this strong interest in affirming the discipline of an attorney with a mental impairment: "We would be shirking our duty as the guardians of the state's bar were we to permit [r]espondent to avoid discipline. Such would surely erode public confidence in the bar."
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Nor is such concern unreasonable. In both Clement and Busch, the courts found compelling evidence of conduct harmful to clients and the administration of justice, and little or no evidence that accommodation of the attorneys' impairments would have permitted that harm to be avoided.
But how does the message of these cases filter down to the large end of the funnel in the disciplinary process? Formal Opinion 03-429 asks supervisory attorneys to assess an attorney's mental impairment and to act so as to prevent future ethical breaches. Similarly, Formal Opinion 03-431 89 requires an attorney who "believes that another lawyer's mental condition materially impairs her ability to represent clients" to report that attorney to disciplinary authorities. In both situations, attorneys are asked to forecast 90 future attorney misconduct on the basis of their unschooled assessment of the attorney's impairment. The bar's strong preference for client protection, as evidenced by Clement and Busch, is likely to encourage attorneys to over-read other attorneys' impairments. in attorney discipline cases, and second, that any ADA-based excuses or mitigation can be addressed during the adjudication process pursuant to Clement's articulation of case-by-case assessment of disability evidence.
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The ADA, then, is likely to be formally unavailable to mentally impaired attorneys enmeshed in the attorney discipline process because they are either not disabled, or because their mental impairment renders them unqualified to practice law, or both. But the philosophy of disability law goes beyond that formal bar. In the low-level cases of concern in this Article, the message attorneys will receive is that, first, the ADA applies only to exotically disabling conditions and not to the eccentricities of fellow attorneys, and second, that to the extent real disabilities emerge as the explanation for ethical misconduct, the interest of the bar in protecting clients and the administration of justice will trump disability law's protection of the attorney. These lessons will mesh nicely with the social biases and fears to which attorneys are subject, leaving the attorney with a psychiatric disability both more likely to be ensnared in the discipline process and without an easy remedy for freeing herself.
III. SPECIFICITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE: ADDRESSING THE CONTEXT, NOT THE CONDUCT
Part II argued that (1) attorneys with mental impairments are governed by disciplinary rules and opinions that subject them to vague standards of conduct; (2) the social biases that infect the treatment of people with mental illness are likely to skew the application of these vague standards to their detriment at the "large end of the funnel"-that is, at the initiation and early stages of the disciplinary process; and (3) neither the void-for-vagueness doctrine nor the ADA are likely to be of much use in correcting this skewing. Implicit in the foregoing argument is that the vague standards of ethical practice are not easily subject to substantial refinement because they must apply to a multiplicity of factual circumstances. The identified danger 92 therefore remains: Attorneys with psychiatric impairments that are apparent to other attorneys will be subject disproportionately and (in many cases) incorrectly to the reporting and adjudication process of the attorney ethics system. This Part takes as given that the standards of ethical practice are and will remain vague. It suggests, however, that attorneys with mental disabilities can benefit from an attempt to approach the problem from, as it were, the other direction. What if we left the standards (e.g., diligence, competence, zeal) as they are, and attempted to specify more carefully what it is to practice well? This endeavor is aided by the fact that a sister profession-medicine-has embarked on just such a venture. As is the case with the law, the standards for the practice of medicine have tended to be quite general and committed to the discretion of each practitioner. In the last several decades, however, researchers have examined the practice of medicine in order to do two things: first, they have looked for unexplained variation in practice; second, they have looked to determine whether patients are harmed or costs are affected by such variation.
The following section briefly describes the extensive literature of small area variations in medical practice and the normative and regulatory response. That response is an attempt to reduce the range of variation in order to avoid patient harm. The subsequent and final section considers whether a cognate effort in the law can both protect patients from harm and, incidentally, protect disfavored attorney groups, such as those with psychiatric impairment, from disparate professional sanction.
A. Small Area Variation in Medical Care
John Wennberg and other researchers associated with Dartmouth Medical School have been studying variation in physician practice for over three decades. This brief discussion can do no more than provide an overview of 93 a technically complex, voluminous body of work. Wennberg's fundamental insights are that variations in physician practice exist and are not explained by professionally valid factors. Further, this variation at least potentially subjects patients to harm and increases the cost of care. As he described in 1984:
Most people view the medical care they receive as a necessity provided by doctors who adhere to scientific norms based on previously untested and proven treatments. When the contents of the medical care "black box" are examined more closely, however, the type of medical service provided is often found to be as strongly influenced by subjective factors related to the attitudes of individual physicians as by science. These subjective considerations, which I call collectively the "practice practitioners for quality care and have generated efforts to identify and publicize best practices across a wide range of physician interventions. The next section suggests an application of this development to the practice of law.
B. Reducing Variation in Legal Practice
Wennberg and his colleagues' studies have pushed medicine to examine its assumptions of the autonomy of physician judgment, the exercise of which has been shown to result in variations that are dangerous to patients and costly to payers. The response to these studies has been calls to reduce ungoverned physician autonomy with the goal of producing more uniform practice. The task will be difficult; it is not, after all, directed toward broad concepts of competence or diligence but to specific choices of interventions in particular care settings.
There is no Wennberg of the law. The adoption of Wennberg's passion by the legal profession, however, could result in better understanding of the level of unwarranted variation in the practice of medicine. Assuming that there is variation in law approaching that which Wennberg has revealed in medicine (a safe assumption), the application of remedies cognate to those suggested for medicine should produce similar remedies: improved service to clients at a reduced cost. But those goals are off the point of this Article. More to the point, I suggest that a Wennberg-like approach-identifying and eliminating unwarranted variations in legal practice-can improve the lot of attorneys with mental disabilities.
To recap, the problem I have suggested is that attorneys with mental disabilities face the large end of the legal disciplinary system's funnel. The orientation of the Model Rules and the formal opinions, combined with societal misunderstanding and distrust of people with psychiatric impairments, are likely to result in many attorneys swept into the disciplinary system because other attorneys make the generalized judgment that the impaired attorney is likely to be unable to ethically represent clients. I say that this judgment will be "generalized" because it is, as is more fully described above, likely to be based on a prediction of future unethical practice based on a style of practice observed by the attorney in the past.
But on what will the reporting attorney base this judgment? There are few "best practices" in the law. There is little research on the degree of preparation an attorney must undertake before the first meeting in a large transaction. There is no study of the proper length of time and amount of billing appropriate for the securing of a particular regulatory permit or license. There is little formal analysis of the amount of pretrial factual investigation 588 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:567 that is appropriate for a minor felony trial. No benchmarks exist for the degree of creativity in research into secondary sources that is appropriate for an appellate brief in an antitrust matter. Attorneys considering the propriety of another's practice style are likely, therefore, to make their assessments on the basis of their ungoverned judgment-their gut. If Wennberg's three decades of research stands for anything, however, it is for the proposition that, in the case of physicians, the ungoverned judgment is a chancy, dangerous thing, as likely to misperceive best practices as to adopt them. Wennberg's work has established that medicine should try its best to supersede judgments based on reified physician autonomy and instead identify best practices and hold physicians to them. If (as is likely) the practice of law is as shot-through with unwarranted variation as is the practice of medicine, then we should be very leery of allowing individual attorneys to apply their idiosyncratic judgments of proper practice in any practice setting to the practice style of any other attorney-let alone one who is likely to invoke fear and misunderstanding in the evaluating attorney.
CONCLUSION
The attorney discipline system contains a series of potential traps for attorneys with psychiatric illness, including those at the "wide end of the funnel," where initial contact with the system occurs. Societal bias and misunderstanding of those with mental illness is likely to infect this system, and disability law is unlikely to provide effective remedies. Their plight cannot be remedied by more carefully crafting the standards for ethical practice; as with tort law, these general standards may be the best we can do. To protect these attorneys (and, incidentally, to protect clients as well) law should borrow from medicine. Medicine has adhered to its general requirements of medical practice but has undertaken to identify, on a procedure-by-procedure basis, best practices for physicians. This effort follows the discovery that physicians, left to their own devices, vary wildly in their styles of practice. There is no reason to believe that the practice of law has less harmful practice variation than does medicine. The attempt to follow medicine's lead to identify good-or best-practices in a variety of settings will protect clients. It may also provide benchmarks that are better for assessing the practice styles of attorneys than the gut of their fellows, thereby squeezing out some of the opportunity for discriminatory ensnarement of attorneys with mental illness in the discipline system.
